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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court, in a few cases scattered over several
decades, has implied the existence of a public right to a free flow
of information1 as one facet of the freedom of speech;2 yet the
Court has refrained from specifically basing a decision on any
such right. But with the recent line of commercial speech deci-
sions,3 the concept-of a public right to a free flow of information
has become firmly established and merits detailed examination.
That right, and the rationale of the Court in its commercial
speech cases, may have far ranging implications. This Article
explores these implications in three areas of immediate interest
to the practitioner: general first amendment theory, the scope of
the limited first amendment protection extended to commercial
speech, and the application of commercial speech guidelines to
attorney advertising.
First amendment theory should serve as a signpost by pro-
viding direction for a court dealing with a free speech problem.
The lack of a cohesive general theory, however, has led to con-
* Justice, Washington Supreme Court. B.A., Jamestown College, 1947; J.D., Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1950.
* * Clerk for United States Magistrate Franklin D. Burgess, Western District, Wash-
ington. B.A., University of Washington, 1980; J.D., University of Puget Sound School of
Law, 1985.
1. Several of these cases are discussed infra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech .... ." This prohibition is applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
3. The Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), first solidly established first amendment protection of com-
mercial speech. While the Court has not yet completely defined commercial speech, pure
commercial speech has been described as speech that does "no more than propose a
commercial transaction," such as "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price."
Id. at 761.
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fused and inconsistent first amendment decisions.4 The Supreme
Court's commercial speech decisions provide a new viewpoint
and an opportunity to reexamine traditional free speech theo-
ries. Part II of this Article explores the impact of the commer-
cial speech cases on first amendment theory. Part III explores
the development of the split of freedom of speech into freedom
of expression and the right to a free flow of information, while
part IV follows the development of commercial speech and the
extension of first amendment protections to attorney advertis-
ing. Part V highlights some of the problems faced by the adver-
tising lawyer, with specific reference to the newly adopted Wash-
ington Rules of Professional Conduct. State rules of professional
responsibility commonly have lagged behind the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the first amendment and have failed to
provide any certain guidelines to the attorney or judge faced
with an issue in attorney advertising.
II. THE ROLE OF FREE SPEECH VALUES IN FIRST AMENDMENT
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's extension of partial first amendment
protection to commercial speech has highlighted the confusion
surrounding free speech analysis.' One leading scholar has noted
that "[t]he outstanding fact about the first amendment today is
that the Supreme Court has never developed any comprehensive
theory of what that constitutional guarantee means and how it
should be applied in concrete cases." 6 Scrambling to keep up
with the Supreme Court's first amendment opinions, commenta-
4. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971).
5. For example, the Court in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy agreed that commercial
speech was valuable enough to merit some protection but not as much as other types of
speech:
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection,
we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are
commonsense differences between speech that does "no more than propose a
commercial transaction," and other varieties. Even if the differences do not
justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, . . . they nonethe-
less suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the
flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.
425 U.S. at 771 n.24. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy and its progeny are discussed infra at
notes 72-140 and accompanying text.
6. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 15 (1970); see also Redish,
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
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tors are required to revise their analyses,7 or suggest comprehen-
sive philosophical justifications of first amendment protection
for future decisions.8
Four principles or values have been advanced as justifying
protections of speech:9 (1) "advancing knowledge and discover-
ing truth";10 (2) facilitating the participation of people in social
and political decision-making; (3) enhancing "individual self-
fulfillment";12 and (4) supplying "a method of achieving a more
adaptable and hence a more stable commentary, of maintaining
the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary
consensus."1 3
Each of these values constitutes a particular virtue that is
advanced by the mechanism of speech protection, and at one
time or another each has been offered as the sole rationale for
protecting speech. This section will explore these traditional val-
ues in light of the Supreme Court's commercial speech rulings.
A. The Role of Speech in Advancing Knowledge and
Discovering Truth
Social theorists have long recognized the essential role of
speech in Western cultural and social development. In 1859,
John Stuart Mill wrote:
The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion
is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the
existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still
7. Compare Professor Meiklejohn's justification of free speech for its value to the
political process, in A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH (1948), to his later argument that pro-
tection is warranted for such "nonpolitical" forms of speech as art, literature, science,
and education, apparently as necessary to ensure that participants in the political pro-
cess have an educated and well-rounded point of view, in Meiklejohn, The First Amend-
ment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 262-63.
8. See, e.g., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REV. 1-56 (1976) (Professor Baker's attempt to persuade the Court to withdraw
first amendment protection of commercial speech) [hereinafter cited as Commercial
Speech].
9. T. EMERSON, supra note 6, at 6-7. While the values suggested by Emerson did not
originate with him, his writings are unique in demonstrating the interaction of these
values. See also Redish, supra note 6, at 591, citing Professor Emerson, "probably the
leading modern theorist of free speech ....
10. T. EMERSON, supra note 6, at 6.
11. Id. at 7.
12. Id. at 6.
13. Id. at 7. This last concept, for brevity, will be referred to as the "safety valve"
function.
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more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are
deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if
wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its col-
lision with error.1 4
Justice Holmes took up this theme and translated it into
the marketplace of ideas concept: "The ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market . . .,.
The value of a "marketplace of ideas" is in the promotion of
truth through the collision and free exchange of opinions."6
Commentators, however, have criticized this justification for
protecting speech as unrealistic.' 7 Moreover, the justification
limits the scope of speech protection, for however effective the
marketplace of ideas may be in promoting truth, it would not
appear to protect such expression as dancing or painting. Com-
14. J. MILL, ON LHERTY 24 (Oxford Univ. Ed. 1971) (1st ed. London 1859). Professor
Baker credits Mill with having provided this concept's "best formulation." Baker, Scope
of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 968 n.9 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Baker]; see also R. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LiBERALisM 11-12 (1968).
15. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Abrams affirmed convictions under the espionage act for conspiring to print and dis-
tribute leaflets encouraging American workers to refuse to support the war effort.
16. The marketplace of ideas concept continues to persuade current first amend-
ment writers. See, e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters,
104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984) (quoting from Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communica-
tions Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969)):
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited mar-
ketplace of ideas in which the truth will ultimately prevail .... [T]he right of
the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and
other ideas and experiences [through the medium of broadcasting] is crucial
here [and it] may not constitutionally be abridged either by the Congress or
the FCC.
Id. at 3116.
17. One commentator has argued:
Just as real world conditions prevent the laissez-faire economic mar-
ket-praised as a social means to facilitate optimal allocation and production
of goods-from achieving the socially desired results, critics of the classic mar-
ketplace of ideas theory point to factors that prevent it from successfully facili-
tating the discovery of truth or generating proper social perspectives and deci-
sions. . . . Because of monopoly control of the media, lack of access of
disfavored or impoverished groups, techniques of behavior manipulation, irra-
tional response to propaganda, and the nonexistence of value-free, objective
truth, the marketplace of ideas fails to achieve the desired results.
Baker, supra note 14, at 965-66. See also Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88
YALE L.J. 1105, 1130 (1979).
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mercial speech also would remain unprotected under this con-
ceptualization because it, too, does not deal with ideas.18 Thus,
the marketplace of ideas justification is not helpful as a method
for delineating first amendment rights in the area of commercial
speech.
B. The Role of Speech in Promoting Democratic Decision
Making
Commentators have asserted that the first amendment does
not protect a "freedom to speak" but rather the freedom of
those activities of thought and communication by which we"govern."' 9 The free speech provision thus is concerned not with
a private right but with a public power: the power of the people
to be governed as they wish.
Certainly people exercise their governing power by voting.
"But in the deeper meaning of the Constitution, voting is merely
the external expression of a wide and diverse number of activi-
ties by means of which citizens attempt to meet the responsibili-
ties of making judgments, which that freedom to govern lays
upon them. '20
One view of the first amendment as promoting the decision-
making process would justify protection of cultural and artistic
speech on the grounds that such speech leads the way "toward
sensitive and informed appreciation and response to the values
out of which the riches of the general welfare are created."'2'
Another view of the first amendment would protect only speech
18. Commercial speech, speech that is limited to who is producing and selling what
product, for what reason, and at what price, is not commonly recognized as expressing
the type of ideas that aid in the promotion of truth or knowledge. Virginia Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976). Commercial
speech has been described as "nonideological" in comparison with noncommercial or
"ideological speech." Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 319 (1974) (Bren-
nan, J. dissenting). Therefore, if free speech protections were theoretically based on the
promotion of truth and knowledge, commercial speech could categorically be denied
protection.
19. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 4, at 26.
20. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. Rxv. 245, 255.
See also BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Sub-
stance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 308 (1978). For a perceptive cri-
tique and analysis of Professor Meiklejohn's writings, see Bollinger, Free Speech and
Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438, 447-61 (1983).
21. Meiklejohn, supra note 20, at 257. See also Kaven, The New York Times Case:
A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191,
221.
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that is explicitly political. The underlying rationale behind this
approach is that expressly political speech should enjoy absolute
protection because if political speech is protected along with
other types of speech less important to society, an overall ero-
sion of speech protections could occur as courts determine the
extent to which nonpolitical forms of speech should be pro-
tected. Differentiation of political speech thus is essential to pre-
serving its absolute protection.22
The logic of the political speech model is persuasive, and
the model has received broad support from commentators s and
courts.2' One commentator has pointed out, however, that while
22. Judge Bork explained:
Explicitly political speech is speech about how we are governed, and the
category therefore includes a wide range of evaluation, criticism, electioneering
and propaganda. It does not cover scientific, educational, commercial or liter-
ary expressions as such. A novel may have impact upon attitudes that affect
politics, but it would not for that reason receive judicial protection. This is not
anomalous, I have tried to suggest, since the rationale of the first amendment
cannot be the protection of all things or activities that influence political atti-
tudes. Any speech may do that, and we have seen that it is impossible to leave
all speech unregulated. Moreover, any conduct may affect political attitudes as
much as a novel, and we cannot view the first amendment as a broad denial of
the power of government to regulate conduct. The line drawn must, therefore,
lie between the explicity political and all else. Not too much should be made of
the undeniable fact that there will be hard cases. Any theory of the first
amendment that does not accord absolute protection for all verbal expression,
which is to say any theory worth discussing, will require that a spectrum be cut
and the location of the cut will always be, arguably, arbitrary. The question is
whether the general location of the cut is justified. The existence of close cases
is not a reason to refuse to draw a line and so deny majorities the power to
govern in areas where their power is legitimate.
Bork, supra note 4, at 28.
23. See, e.g., Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 177 A.B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521. Blasi proposes yet another variation: the ultimate value served
by freedom of speech is its "checking" power on the government. In other words, the
most favored speech is that which points out governmental or official misconduct. Id. at
527.
24. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985).
There can be no doubt that the expenditures at issue in this case produce
speech at the core of the First Amendment. We said in Buckley v. Valeo:
"The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in
an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discus-
sion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates
are integral to the operation of the system of government established
by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest pro-
tection to such political expression in order 'to assure [the] unfet-
tered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.'. . . This no more than reflects
our 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
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under this theory the ultimate value of speech lies in its further-
ing of the democratic process, the democratic process itself may
be seen as a means to furthering other social and individual
ends.25 In either event, there is no place in this theory for com-
mercial speech, thus limiting the usefulness of this theory as an
analytical tool.26
C. Speech as a Means to Self-Fulfillment
Speech can be seen as a natural right fundamental to
human existence: "What, finally, of speech as an expression of
self? As a cry of impulse no less than that as a dispassionate
contribution to intellectual dialogue? '27
One view of free speech as an end in itself has been referred
to as the "liberty model. '28 The liberty model founds protection
of speech upon a perception of the self. "The values supported
or functions performed by protected speech result from that
speech being a manifestation of individual freedom and choice
.... "29 Accordingly, to be protected, speech must "represent
an attempt to create or affect the world in a way which can be
expected to represent [someone's] private or personal wishes."30
Because the first amendment would protect only speech that is
uttered in fulfillment of an individual need, merely profit-moti-
vated or commercial speech would not enjoy the protection it
now receives.31
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .
Id. at 1467 (citations omitted).
25. Redish, supra note 6, at 603-04. See also infra text accompanying note 39; Red-
ish, supra note 6, at 604-11 (attacking what he terms "Meiklejohn logic").
26. The Court's frequently employed categorical approach to speech cases allows
commercial speech to be distinguished from political speech and thus afforded less pro-
tection. Accordingly, a theoretical approach to the first amendment based on valuing
only political speech could lead to further disregard for commercial speech. See New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (advertisement paid for by civil rights
group, soliciting funds and making critical comments on government officials, held to be
political speech and not commercial speech, and thus was constitutionally protected
speech.)
27. L. TRIaE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIoNAL LAW § 12-1, at 577 (1978).
28. Baker, supra note 14, at 990. See also Commercial Speech, supra note 8, at 5.
29. Commercial Speech, supra note 8, at 3.
30. Id.
31. Id.; see generally, supra notes 3, 5, and infra notes 74-77. Thus, to Professor
Baker, the freedom of speech embodied in the first amendment is solely an individual
right to expression. One purpose of this Article is to demonstrate the growing recognition
of a dual right: an individual right to express oneself, coupled with a societal right to
know. This dual right will be explored infra notes 43-62 and accompanying text. See also
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The liberty model has been criticized as artificially narrow
and restrictive of information necessary to the development of
individual fulfillment,3 2 but the model does enunciate a real
value that has been influential in some first amendment cases.33
It does not, however, incorporate and synthesize the most recent
developments in speech jurisprudence. Under the liberty model,
not only would commercial speech be unprotected, but speech
uttered by a corporation and other ordinarily protected speech
that is uttered for a commercial reason also would be unpro-
tected.3 4 Yet the Supreme Court has, in each instance, found
such speech to be protected.
D. Speech as a "Safety Valve"
The "safety valve" model was suggested by the manner in
which speech protections channel expression in ways that
strengthen and support a social structure.
Those who won our independence . . .knew that order
can not be secured merely through fear of punishment for its
infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed griev-
ances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for
evil counsels is good ones.36
Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756
(1976). Cf., Stoltenberg & Whitman, Direct-Mail Advertising by Lawyers, 45 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 381, 382-83 (1984); Comment, Commercial Speech and the Limits of Legal Adver-
tising, 58 OR. L. REv. 193, 205-10 (1979).
32. Redish, supra note 6, at 620-21.
33. See First Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804-05 (1978) (White,'J. dis-
senting) ("Indeed, what some have considered to be the principal function of the First
Amendment, the use of communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization,
and self-fulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate speech.").
34. Baker points out that commercial speech is directed at promoting the economic
standing of an individual or company and not directed at expressing a personal belief.
Thus, commercial speech is not a manifestation of individual freedom or choice and
should not be protected under his theoretical model. See Commercial Speech, supra
note 8, at 16-17.
35. Commercial speech was protected in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1978); corporate speech was protected in First
Bank of Boston v. Belliotti, 435 U.S. 765; otherwise protected speech uttered solely for
commercial reasons was protected in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1974).
36. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., con-
curring). See also, Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438, 454-
55 (1983). This "safety valve" virtue of free speech continues to enter first amendment
[Vol. 9:293
1986] Lawyer Advertising
As under the democratic decisionmaking theory, however,
the safety valve model treats speech solely as a means and dem-
ocratic processes as the end. 7 Such theories fail to take free
analysis. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (quoting with
approval Brandeis' dissent in Whitney).
37. See generally Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist
Approach to Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1273 (1983). Blum's model considers speech protections solely as a tool for turning the
most politically helpless groups (those most likely to disrupt the system if frustrated)
into eager participants in the political process.
A concept of equal liberty has implicitly guided the Court in creating these
entitlements. The Court has proclaimed individual rights only for speech activ-
ities that are accessible to citizens generally. The Court has accorded speech
activities that are not accessible to everyone, such as radio and television
broadcasts, the less absolute form of protection associated with the collective
right. By making universal accessibility a precondition for the creation of
behavioral entitlements, the Court effectively has equalized the first amend-
ment liberty of the rich and the poor. By providing absolutist protection only
for the common forms of speech to which all citizens have access, the Court
has implicitly used a concept of equality to limit the domain of individual
liberty.
One cannot, however, attribute this use of equality as a limiting principle
to our society's commitment to substantive political equality because no such
commitment exists. The principle of equal liberty derives instead from strate-
gic political considerations. The Supreme Court adopted and established the
broad outlines of contemporary free speech doctrine during the New Deal
period. Since its inception, the modern idea of free speech has been integral to
a larger, essentially social or liberal democratic, strategy of governance. This
strategy has included strong protection of individual's rights to speak and
organize, and the creation of a strong, centralized, democratic welfare state.
These two aspects of the strategy have been mutually supporting. First amend-
ment protection has enhanced opportunities for legitimate political initiative
among the lower classes, and this initiative has helped to create a political base
for the welfare state. Conversely, the existence of a state sufficiently powerful
to gain independence from dominant economic forces and to redistribute
income has increased the likelihood of successful integration of dissident move-
ments. The integration of social movements has reduced the need to use politi-
cal repression except as a last resort.
The interest in protecting the organizing activities of social movements
accounts for the creation of behavioral entitlements for the traditional, in-per-
son speech activities of assembling, speaking, and leafletting. Protection of
these activities affords groups a secure sanctuary from threats of persecution
and encourages dissidents to channel their energies into the established politi-
cal system. Such channeling is facilitated by refraining from acts of repression
that would diminish groups' ability and propensity to participate in the electo-
ral system, but at the same time limiting groups' capacity to generate power by
alternative means, such as the threat of disruption. It follows that activities the
very exercise of which is potentially disruptive of the accepted conception of
social order do not receive absolutist protection. Behavioral entitlements have
been designed principally to permit movements to integrate into the political
system, and their scope is limited by this design. While this strategy of chan-
neling dissident movements into the political system has deradicalized some
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speech into account as an entitlement of human existences8 and
an end in itself, and refuse to recognize that democratic
processes perhaps are a means to developing and enjoying our
humanity.39 Thinking of free speech simply as a means to cer-
tain ends could signal the first step in removing the sanctity
presently surrounding the first amendment and depriving it of
the safeguards many believe it deserves.'0
E. A New Approach: The "Self-Realization" Model
The four justifications discussed above-the marketplace of
ideas model, the political speech model, the self-fulfillment
model, and the safety-valve model-each embody a benefit that
free speech offers society. However, these aggregated values
focus on only one branch of the first amendment: the right of
the individual speaker to express a view. None of these justifica-
tions directly incorporates a public right to receive information.
The Supreme Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council4 recognized such a right. A new
model for the first amendment thus must be constructed. 2
popular movements, it has also expanded the state's powers and humanitarian
agenda by broadening its political base.
Id. at 1276-78 (footnotes omitted).
38. For example, speech may be a way to self-fulfillment. See supra notes 27-35 and
accompanying text.
39. This philosophy was earlier propounded by John Locke:
But though Men when they enter into Society, give up the Equality, Lib-
erty, and Executive Power they had in the State of Nature, into the hands of
the Society, to be so far disposed of by the Legislative, as the good of the
Society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one for the
better to preserve himself his Liberty and Property; (For no rational Creature
can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the
power of the Society, or Legislative constituted by them, can never be sup-
pos'd to extend farther than the common good ....
J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 398 (from Cambridge University Press ed.
1063, J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT) (emphasis added). See also Walker, A
Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 285, 288 (1966).
40. Moreover, commercial speech is not recognized under this model. Commercial
speech is not generated by the frustrated or disenfranchised, and those are the speakers
protected by the safety valve model. Thus, like the other models discussed, the safety
valve model is an incomplete first amendment philosophy and cannot be relied upon to
afford society the fullest measure of protection.
41. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
42. See Commercial Speech, supra note 8. Although Baker embraces the self-fufill-
ment model, he does not perceive it as incorporating public or societal rights. He does,
however, focus on the individual's benefit from freedom: "To justify legal obligation, the
community must respect individuals as equal, rational and autonomous moral beings.
For the community legitimately to expect individuals to respect collective' decisions, i.e.,
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One commentator has proposed a value scheme that would
encompass the models discussed above as well as a public right
to information. The value has been labelled "individual self-
realization.' '43
This term [individual self-realization] has been chosen
largely because of its ambiguity: it can be interpreted to refer
either to development of the individual's powers and abili-
ties-an individual "realizes" his or her full potential-or to
the individual's control of his or her own destiny through mak-
ing life-affecting decisions-an individual "realizes" the goals
in life that he or she has set.44
The self-realization model is grounded in the idea that an
individual is constantly confronted with the necessity of making
life-affecting decisions and therefore should have available a free
flow of information upon which to base those decisions. Trying
to choose a toothpaste for your family,'5 while mundane, none-
theless may ultimately be as life-affecting a decision as choosing
an ideology.
The self-realization model is not aimed at superseding the
other first amendment philosophies, but subsumes those other
philosophies as subvalues of self-realization. 4 Each of the theo-
ries discussed above suggests a valid justification for the protec-
tion of speech, but the primary reason for protecting speech is
its role in allowing each of us to realize our individual human
potential. Thus, the self-realization theory recognizes each indi-
vidual's need for an unrestrained flow of information to enable
him to make informed choices in his daily existence. The theory
makes no distinction between big choices, such as choosing
between laissez-faire capitalism or socialism, and little choices,
such as choosing between different makes of dishwashers (which
could affect the amount of leisure time available for making big
choices). The theory therefore acknowledges that there must be
not only a freedom to speak but also a freedom to hear.
legal rules, the community must respect the dignity and equal worth of its members."
Baker, supra note 14, at 991.
43. Redish, supra note 6, at 593.
44. Id.
45. Or seeking medicines at reasonable prices, see Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. 748.
46. Redish, supra note 6, at 594.
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III. FREEDOM TO SPEAK-FREEDOM TO HEAR
The individual self-realization model recognizes that the
right to free speech is actually two rights. The value systems dis-
cussed in part II focused only upon the freedom of expres-
sion-the right of an individual to communicate outwardly an
opinion, a point of view, or even a "cry of impulse."'47 However,
the right to know and to be assured of a flow of information is
essential to an individual's control over her "own destiny
through making life-affecting decisions."' 8
The concept of a right to a free flow of information, and the
extent to which the Supreme Court has recognized that right,
has evolved over many years. As long ago as 1923 the Court crit-
icized a state's attempt to hinder "the opportunities of pupils to
acquire knowledge."49 In 1943 the Court agreed that the first
amendment "embraces the right to distribute litera-
ture . . . and necessarily protects the right to receive it."50 In
neither of these cases, however, does the right to receive infor-
mation appear as much more than a gratuitous judicial flourish.
In Thomas v. Collins1 the Court granted a writ of habeas
47. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
48. Redish, supra note 6, at 593; see also Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right
to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1:
It is clear at the outset that the right to know fits readily into the first
amendment and the whole system of freedom of expression. Reduced to its
simplest terms, the concept includes two closely related features: first, the right
to read, to listen, to see, and to otherwise receive communications; and second,
the right to obtain information as a basis for transmitting ideas or facts to
others. Together these constitute the reverse side of the coin from the right to
communicate. But the coin is one piece, namely the system of freedom of
expression.
Moreover, the right to know serves much the same function in our society
as the right to communicate. It is essential to personal self-fulfillment. It is a
signficant method for seeking the truth, or at least for seeking the better
answer. It is necessary for collective decision-making in a democratic society.
And it is vital as a mechanism for effectuating social change without resort to
violence or undue coercion.
Emerson, supra, at 2 (emphasis added).
49. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). In this case the Court reversed a
conviction under a statute prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language to students
under the eighth grade. Although the Court seemed to rest its decision largely upon the
teacher's due process rights, the arbitrariness of the statute, and the lack of a reasonable
relation to a legitimate state end, this case often is cited for its recognition of the value
of encouraging a free flow of information. See L. TRIBE, supra note 27, § 12-19 at 675.
50. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (an ordinance prohibiting "door-
belling" for the purpose of distributing handbills held unconstitutional).
51. 323 U.S. 516 (1944).
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corpus in favor of a labor organizer jailed for addressing an audi-
ence in violation of a temporary restraining order. In its reason-
ing, the Court seemed to rely not upon the labor organizer's
right to speak, but upon the right of the audience "fully and
freely to discuss and be informed concerning this choice, pri-
vately or in public assembly."52 And in Lamont v. Postmaster
General,5" the Court struck down a postal regulation that pro-
vided for "communist propaganda" to be retained by the postal
authorities and released only at the addressee's specific request,
holding that the regulation violated the first amendment rights
of the intended recipient.5 4
Other decisions have upheld the right of the individual to
receive information,55 but in Procunier v. Martinez,56 the Court
seemed temporarily to draw back from admitting the existence
of such a right. Although the Court held that censorship of
prison mail abridged the first amendment rights of the intended
recipients, the Court limited its focus to individual rights of
recipients and did not go so far as to find a societal right. "We
52. Id. at 534. This case is interesting too in that the state contended that there was
no first amendment issue present because this was, in essence, commercial speech. It is
perhaps for this reason that the Court did not rely heavily on the right of the organizer
to speak, and rather on the right of the audience to know. Commercial speech was
deemed to be unprotected until the decision in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748.
53. 381 U.S. 301 (1964).
54. While the Court did not comment on the extent of an individual's right to
receive information, Justice Brennan, concurring, wrote:
It is true that the first amendment contains no specific guarantee of access
to publications. However, the protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the
specific guarantees to protect from congressional abridgement those wholly
fundamental personal rights necessary to make the express guarantees fully
meaningful. [citations omitted] I think the right to receive publications is such
a fundamental right. The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if oth-
erwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be
a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.
Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
55. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (upholding an individual's right
to possess obscene films); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (affirming an FCC order that a radio station supply air
time to the subject of a prior editorial attack). The Court in Red Lion stressed:
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount.. . . It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail. ...
It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.
395 U.S. at 390. See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763 (1972). But cf. Miami
Herald Publ. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down statute that would force
newspaper to give space to political candidate to rebut prior published accusations).
56. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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do not deal here with difficult questions of the so-called 'right to
hear' and third-party standing but with a particular means of
communication in which the interests of both parties are inextri-
cably meshed. 57
It was not until Virginia Board of Pharmacy5 that the
Court fully recognized a public right to receive information. The
Court has continued to enunciate this right, primarily in com-
mercial speech cases.59 However, the Court occasionally has
accompanied discussion of a public right to a flow of information
with terminology similar to Justice Holmes' "marketplace of
ideas" concept.60 Such language has contributed to the confusion
surrounding the constitutional status of commercial speech. The
proponents of the traditional marketplace of ideas concept
advance the theory as an avenue to truth. 1 Why, then, should
mere commercial advertising be given protected status in a sys-
tem meant to promote truth?
But despite the marketplace of ideas talisman, the Court
clearly is promoting a value beyond the traditional marketplace
of ideas concept:
The listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's concern
for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener
than his concern for urgent political dialogue ....
[C]ommercial speech serves to inform the public of the availa-
bility, nature, and prices of products and services, and thus
performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in
a free enterprise system .... In short, such speech serves
individual and societal interests in assuring informed and
reliable decisionmaking.2
Thus the Court apparently has moved beyond traditional first
amendment theory and has approached the individual self-reali-
57. Id. at 409.
58. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
59. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), discussed infra notes 90-
113 and accompanying text; Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977),
discussed infra note 145 and accompanying text; Central Hudson Gas and Elec. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980), discussed infra notes 143-55 and accompany-
ing text; In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982), discussed infra notes 114-27 and accompany-
ing text.
60. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825-26 (1975); Virginia Bd. of Phar-
macy, 425 U.S. at 760.
61. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
62. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (emphasis added). See




IV. PROTECTED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The idea that commercial speech is somehow different from
other, protected forms of speech was set out in Valentine v.
Chrestensen.6 A merchant advertised an exhibit by distributing
handbills, thereby violating a New York litter law that banned
commercial handbills. The Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statute: "[T]he Constitution imposes no such
restraint on government [regulation] as respects purely commer-
cial advertising."' 4
This complete exclusion of commercial advertising from
first amendment protection was eroded in subsequent deci-
sions."5 In Cammarano v. United States,6 Justice Douglas, con-
curring with a judgment that upheld IRS regulations classifying
funds spent for political advertising as a nonbusiness expense,
stated that the Valentine ruling was "casual, almost offhand.
And it has not survived reflection. 6 7 He went on to explain that
simply because speech is "advertising, it is not thereby com-
pletely stripped of first amendment protection."" Justice Bren-
nan, dissenting in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,69 cited
Justice Douglas' Cammarano concurrence and noted that
63. 316 U.S. 52 (1941).
64. Id. at 54.
65. "With one exception, the commercial speech doctrine was never employed by
the Supreme Court as a basis for denying first amendment protection." Comment, Attor-
ney Advertising in Maryland: A Need for Stricter Control, 13 U. BAT. L. REV. 92, 95
(1983) (footnote omitted). See also Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. But see
Capital Broadcasting v. Acting Attorney General, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971) (ban
on cigarette advertising on television held not to violate first amendment because ads
were commercial speech; therefore, cigarette advertising less protected than other
speech), affd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); accord, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel.
Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (order preventing newspaper from organizing want ads in
male-female columns held constitutional).
Neither of the above cases rested squarely on the Valentine rule. Capital Broad-
casting made much of the uniquely regulatory nature of the electronic broadcasting
medium while Pittsburgh Press rested much of its weight on the principle that the ads
were illegal and thus unprotected, regardless of whether they were commercial speech or
not.
66. 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 514.
68. Id.
69. 418 U.S. 298 (1974). Lehman was a candidate for state office, and sued the City
of Shaker Heights for its refusal to sell him advertising space on the city bus system.
The Court held that the city's policy of refusing political ads was within the city's discre-
tion, and that card space on a bus was not a traditional first amendment forum.
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"[t]here is some doubt concerning whether the 'commercial
speech' distinction announced in Valentine v. Chrestensen...
retains continuing validity."70
In other cases, the Court found ways of sidestepping the
Valentine holding; commonly, the Court found speech in the
disputed advertisement worthy of protection because it dis-
cussed social or political issues.71 In Virginia Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,72 the Supreme
Court finally faced the Valentine commercial speech rule head
on and held that even pure commercial speech deserved some
measure of first amendment protection.
A. Extension of Protection to Pure Commercial Speech
In Virginia Board of Pharmacy a consumer group chal-
lenged a statute that forbade pharmacists to advertise drug
prices. The Virginia Board of Pharmacy, defending the regula-
tion, asserted that aggressive competition would endanger the
quality of the pharmacist's services, harm valuable pharmacist-
customer relationships, and damage the professional image of
the pharmacist. 3 The United States Supreme Court disagreed.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, noted that free-
dom of speech assumes both a willing speaker and a listener,
70. Id. at 314 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Brennan went
on to suggest that even advertising "is 'speech' nonetheless, often communicating infor-
mation and ideas found by many persons to be controversial." Id. at 314 (footnote
omitted).
71. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (ordinance applied
to prohibit door-to-door selling of religious literature held to be violation of the first
amendment; although states may prohibit distribution of purely commercial leaflets,
even those with a "'moral platitude'" attached, "the mere fact that the religious litera-
ture is 'sold' by itinerant preachers rather than 'donated' does not transform evangelism
into a commercial enterprise"); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1944) (labor
organizer, violating a court order to avoid urging workers to join union, granted a writ of
habeas corpus: "The right thus to discuss, and inform people concerning, the advantages
and disadvantages of unions. . . is protected. . . as part of free speech" and so cannot
be dismissed as "business or economic activity"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (in libel suit against publishers of an advertisement soliciting funds for
civil rights movement, advertisement was protected by first amendment). The Court in
New York Times held, inter alia, that the advertisement was protected under the com-
mercial speech doctrine because it discussed "matters of the highest public interest and
concern." Id. at 266; Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1974) (in conviction of news-
paper publisher for violating statute forbidding encouraging abortion, the Court held
that although speech was commercial, it was protected by the first amendment because
"[it] conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience .... .
72. 425 U.S. 748.
73. Id. at 766-69.
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and that the first amendment protects both.7 The free flow of
information, even if limited "to who is producing and selling
what product, for what reason, and at what price, ' 75 is indispen-
sable to the allocation of resources in our market economy and
to the "formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system
ought to be regulated or altered. ' 76 He concluded that the free
flow of information should therefore be protected by the first
amendment.77
Virginia Board of Pharmacy does not hold, however, that
commercial speech has the same level of protection as other
forms of expression. Justice Blackmun pointed out that pure
commercial speech is in certain respects different from other
kinds of speech.78 Compared with news reporting, for instance,
the truth of commercial speech would be easier for the adver-
tiser to ascertain. Because advertising is for the advertiser's own
financial interest, it is less likely to be chilled by regulation than
would other types of speech. 79 Therefore, when a substantial
governmental interest exists, commercial speech may be regu-
lated as to the time, place, and manner of presentation,"0 and as
74. Id. at 756-57.
75. Id. at 765.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 771 n.24.
79. The "commonsense differences" between commercial speech and other protected
forms
suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow
of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired. The truth of
commercial speech, for example, may be more easily verifiable by its dissemi-
nator than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary. . . . Also, com-
mercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the
sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled
by proper regulation and foregone entirely ....
Attributes such as these, the greater objectivity and hardiness of commer-
cial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for
fear of silencing the speaker. . . . They may also make it appropriate to
require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include such addi-
tional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent it
being deceptive. . . . They may also make inapplicable the prohibition against
prior restraints. ...
Id. at 771, n.24 (citations omitted).
80. "[T]ime, place, and manner restrictions are permissible if 'they are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, . . . serve significant govern-
mental interests, and. .. leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information.'" Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 526 (1981) (quoting
Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771). Accord Spencer v. Honorable Justices of
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 579 F. Supp. 880, 889 n.12 (1984), discussed infra notes
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to any illegality of the transaction proposed. Additionally, com-
mercial speech is not protected if it is false or misleading.81
Finally, Virginia Board of Pharmacy expressly refrained
from extending commercial speech protection to professions that
do not dispense standardized products, such as the profession of
law.82  That extension was left for another case the following
year. The Court offered further guidance to commercial speech
analysis in its opinion in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission"s by formulating the following test
for commercial speech regulation:
Speech may be regulated if (1) it is false, misleading, deceptive
or concerns an unlawful activity; or (2) if the government has a
substantial interest to be protected; and (a) the questioned reg-
ulation directly advances that asserted government interest;
and (b) the questioned regulation is not more extensive than is
necessary to further that interest.84
The Central Hudson Court found that a state's prohibition
of advertising by electrical utilities violated the first amend-
ment, even though the state had a substantial interest in energy
conservation and even though the state regulation directly
advanced the state interest.8 5 The Court ruled that the regula-
tion-a complete ban on advertising by electric utilities-was
too extensive and might bar promotion of possible energy saving
179-89 and accompanying text.
81. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
82. Id. at 773 note 25.
83. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
84. Id. at 566.
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within the provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the gov-
ernmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve that interest.
Id. Note that the second line of the above quote implies that speech is protected where it
falls into a certain content category. See Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches
to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671 (1983) (critique of the dangers of "catego-
rizing" speech on the basis of its capacity to mislead).
85. 447 U.S. at 571-72. Some guidance may be found as to what constitutes a sub-
stantial governmental interest by referring to Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490 (1981). In Metromedia, the Court upheld an ordinance restricting billboard use,
based on the governmental interests in traffic safety and city aesthetics.
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devices.86 According to the Court, "no showing has been made
that a more limited restriction on the content of promotional
advertising would not serve adequately the State's interests."8
It should be noted that the Court gave the state the burden of
showing that the regulation was not overbroad and in the
absence of such a showing the regulation failed: "In the absence
of a showing that more limited speech regulation would be inef-
fective, we cannot approve the complete suppression of Central
Hudson's advertising." 88  The Court suggested alternative
schemes of advancing the state's interests, including prescreen-
ing of proposed advertising, and indicated that the doctrine of
prior restraint may not apply to commercial speech.89
B. First Amendment Protections of Attorney Advertising
1. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona9"
In Bates, two Arizona attorneys advertised their law firm in
a newspaper, offering "legal services at very reasonable fees" and
listing their fees for certain routine legal services.9" The Arizona
Supreme Court held that the attorneys had violated Arizona's
code of professional responsibility.2 Upon appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, the Arizona Bar Association, in defense
of its disciplinary rule, argued that advertising would (1)
adversely affect professionalism, (2) detract from the adminis-
tration of justice, (3) affect the quality of legal service, (4) be
inherently misleading, (5) drive up the cost of legal services, and
(6) be difficult to effectively regulate. 93 The Court, reversing the
Arizona Supreme Court, held that the Arizona Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, as applied to defendant's conduct, violated
the first amendment.9 4
Responding to the state's first assertion, the Court down-
played the idea that public notice of the fact that attorneys
make their living by practicing law would significantly tarnish
86. 447 U.S. at 570.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 571.
89. Id. at 571, n.13.
90. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
91. Id. at 354.
92. Id. at 356-58.
93. Id. at 368-79.
94. Id. at 384.
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the image of the profession either in the eyes of the practitioners
or in the eyes of the public.9e The Court noted that other profes-
sions allow advertising and yet are not considered undignified.,
The Court placed little credence in the contention that advertis-
ing would detract from the administration of justice,97 and it was
not persuaded that advertising would encourage fraudulent use
or overuse of the judicial system," citing statistics showing that
advertising might help to reverse the present trend towards
underutilization of attorneys."
The Court dismissed the idea that advertising would affect
the quality of legal work: "An attorney who is inclined to cut
95. Id. at 369.
96. Id. (finding that bankers and engineers, in particular, advertise and are not con-
sidered undignified). See also L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING
AND SOLICITATION 77 (1980) ("It might be argued that advertising can't do anything to
worsen the image of lawyers. A 1977 Harris poll of 17 institutions showed the public
holds the legal profession in fairly low esteem, ranking lawyers only above advertising
executives.").
97. Bates, 433 U.S. at 376.
98. Specifically, the Arizona Bar suggested that advertising would "have the unde-
sirable effect of stirring up litigation." Id. at 375. The Court minimized this concern:
"[W]e cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a person to suffer a wrong
silently than to redress it by legal action." Id. at 376. See also In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d
204 (Minn. 1981) (dismissal of disciplinary proceeding against attorneys who had vio-
lated state's disciplinary rules in distributing brochure advising women who had used
"Dalkon Shield" intra-uterine devices of their legal rights against the IUD manufac-
turer). The court in Appert agreed that the attorney's brochure did indeed stir up litiga-
tion, but held that the brochures were protected speech:
In contrast to the lack of compelling state justifications for restricting
advertising, the facts in this case demonstrate that important individual and
public interests are present. The information supplied through respondents'
distribution of the letter and brochure made several injured parties aware of
their legal position and absent access to the letter and brochure, some of these
individuals would not have been made aware of their rights. The manufacturer,
against whom the solicited litigation was directed, apparently engaged in par-
ticularly egregious conduct which resulted in severe and permanent injuries to
a substantial number of people.
Id. at 210. The Supreme Court considered a similar advertisement, in Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985), and held in accord with the Minnesota
court. See infra note 133.
99. 433 U.S. at 370-71 nn.22-23. The Court cites to, among other reports, the ABA's
REVISED HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, at 26 (1972): "We are persuaded that
the actual or feared price of such services coupled with a sense of unequal bargaining
status is a significant barrier to wider utilization of legal services." See also CURRAN, THE
LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1977). In an ABA sponsored survey, 10% of those surveyed
agreed with the statement, "[M]ost people who go to lawyers are troublemakers"; 44%
agreed that "[a] person should not call upon a lawyer until he has exhausted every other
possible way of solving his problem"; and 83% agreed that "[a] lot of people do not go to
lawyers because they have no way of knowing which lawyer is competent to handle their
particular problem." Id. at 228.
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quality will do so regardless of the rule on advertising."100 The
Court also disagreed that attorney advertising is inherently mis-
leading. For example, the State had suggested that legal services
were not so routine as to allow advertisement of fixed prices for
particular services. 101 The Court responded that these prices
would not be misleading so long as the attorney performed the
advertised services at the advertised price.10 2 The State also con-
tended that advertising is misleading in that it does not provide
sufficient foundation on which to select an attorney. 03 While the
Court conceded that advertising could not provide all of the
information needed to choose an attorney wisely, it noted that
the solution was not to ban advertising, thereby preventing any
information from getting to the consumer, 0 " but rather to
encourage information flow.10 5
In response to the contention that advertising would drive
up legal fees, the Court pointed to statistics that tended to show
that advertising would lower prices for legal services.10 6 Finally,
in response to the State's assertion that extensive enforcement
problems justified banning attorney advertising, the Court dis-
agreed with the State's assumption that a large number of attor-
neys would "overreach through advertising," suggesting that
attorneys by and large would continue to be "candid and honest
and straightforward.' 10 7 In conclusion, the Court agreed that
while the Arizona State Bar had raised some plausible concerns,
none of those concerns overcame the public need for information
about attorneys. 08
The Bates holding, although narrow, 0 9 reiterated the rule of
Virginia Board of Pharmacy: advertising that is false or mis-
100. Bates, 433 U.S. at 378. See also L. ANDREWS, supra note 96, at 80-82.
101. Bates, 433 U.S. at 372.
102. Id. at 372-73.
103. Id. at 374-75.
104. Id. at 374.
105. Id. at 375.
106. Id. at 377. See also L. ANDREWS, supra note 96, at 79-80.
107. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379.
108. Id.
109. The Court narrowed its holding thusly:
The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the state may prevent the
publication in a newspaper of appellants' truthful advertisement concerning
the availability and terms of routine legal services. We rule simply that the
flow of such information may not be restrained, and we therefore hold the pre-
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leading or proposes illegal transactions may be suppressed, and
reasonable restrictions on the time, place and manner of adver-
tising will be allowed.110 The Court reserved judgment as to
advertising via electronic medial"and suggested that claims hav-
ing to do with quality of services or any in-person solicitation
might be inherently misleading.1 12 The Court further suggested
that the state might be permitted to require disclaimers or
warnings in some advertisements."'
2. In re R.M.J. 1 4
The Court applied the Central Hudson formula'" to deter-
mine the constitutionality of attorney advertising regulation in
In re R.M.J..116 In so doing, the Court held that the state failed
to show that its interests were directly advanced by the
regulation.'7
At issue was a Missouri regulation containing a list of areas
of practice that were approved for advertisement."8 In his news-
paper advertisement, the appellant attorney departed from the
exact authorized terms (using, for example, "personal injury"
rather than the approved "tort law") and listed legal areas not
authorized in the regulation." 9 The Court, ruling that the appel-
lant's list was protected, stated that "[b]ecause the listing pub-
lished by the appellant has not been shown to be misleading,
and because the Advisory Committee suggests no substantial
interest promoted by the restriction, we conclude that this por-
tion of [the rule] is an invalid restriction upon speech as applied
to appellant's advertisements."' 20
Missouri's regulation also did not authorize inclusion of
information about the courts before which an attorney was enti-
tled to practice.'' The appellant, however, included in the
110. Id. at 383-84.
111. Id. at 384.
112. Id. at 383-84.
113. Id. at 384.
114. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
115. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
116. 455 U.S. at 203-04 n.15.
117. Id. at 205 (referring to Sup. Ct. Rule 4, DR 2-101 (1978) and Rule 4, Adden-
dum III (Adv. Comm. Nov. 13, 1977), found at page 193 nn.1-6)).
118. Id. at 195-96, n.6.
119. Id. at 197.
120. Id. at 205.
121. Id. at 197-98.
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advertisement in large type: "Admitted To Practice Before THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT." Justice Powell, writ-
ing for the majority, found this statement to be in poor taste
and possibly deceptive, 122 but because there was no finding in
the lower courts that the statement was misleading, the Court
held the issuance of a reprimand by the Missouri Court to be
unwarranted.12 3
Missouri's disciplinary rule also prohibited mailings to per-
sons with whom the attorney had not had prior dealings.'24 The
appellant had sent cards announcing the opening of his office to
people with whom he had no relation. Again, the Supreme Court
held that the disciplinary rule was not narrow enough. The
Court noted that mailings might be more difficult to supervise
than newspaper advertisements, but suggested that attorneys be
required to submit a copy of all mailings to the Advisory Com-
mittee. 12  Similarly, in response to the Advisory Committee's
claim that direct mailings would be "frightening" to an unso-
phisticated public, Justice Powell suggested that the face of all
such envelopes be stamped with the legend, "This is an
Advertisement.' 2
The R.M.J. decision crystallized attorney commercial
speech analysis. The succinct four-part test announced in Cen-
tral Hudson now is applicable to most regulation of advertising
and other commercial speech. 27
3. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 2 8
The Court in Zauderer applied the now familiar'2 9 Central
122. Justice Powell stated:
Indeed, such a statement could be misleading to the general public unfamiliar
with the requirements of admission to the Bar of this Court. Yet there is no
finding to this effect by the Missouri Supreme Court. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that the inclusion of this information was misleading. Nor
does the Rule specifically identify this information as potentially misleading
or, for example, place a limitation on type size or require a statement explain-
ing the nature of the Supreme Court Bar.
Id. at 205-06.
123. Id. at 206.
124. Id. at 196.
125. Id. at 206.
126. Id. at 206 n.20.
127. Id. at 203, and n.15.
128. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
129. "Our general approach to restrictions on commercial speech is by now well set-
tled." Id. at 2275.
1986]
316 University of Puget Sound Law Review
Hudson commercial speech formula to three new first amend-
ment questions: whether a state could: (1) prohibit advertise-
ments that contained advice regarding specific legal problems;
(2) prohibit advertisements containing illustrations; or (3)
require certain disclaimers relating to the terms of contingent
fees. Iao
In Zauderer, an attorney had placed a newspaper advertise-
ment containing specific advice addressed to users of the Dalkon
Shield intrauterine device. 131 The Court noted that there was
nothing deceptive or misleading in the advice offered regarding
the shield users' specific legal problem. Therefore, the advertise-
ment could not be restricted under the state's power to regulate
inherently deceptive advertising. 32 The holding thus placed on
the State the burden of showing that its regulation advanced a
substantial government interest. The Court also concluded that
the advertisement did not approach the dangers inherent in in-
person solicitation. 133
The State asserted that inhibiting lawyers from stirring up
litigation was a sufficient state interest for regulating legal
advice in advertisements. The State's evidence showed that the
advertisement had encouraged 106 women to come to the attor-
ney and sue the makers of the Dalkon Shield. The State argued
that even if this particular advertisement were harmless, such a
prophylactic rule is warranted by the regulatory difficulties in
ensuring that attorneys do not stir up "meritless" litigation. 3 4
The Court disagreed:
The State's argument that it may apply a prophylactic
rule to punish appellant notwithstanding that his particular
advertisement has none of the vices that allegedly justify the
rule is in tension with our insistence that restrictions involving
commercial speech that is not itself deceptive be narrowly
130. Id.
131. The advertisement reported that the Dalkon shield had set off many lawsuits
and that the attorney represented other women in such lawsuits, and advised women not
to assume that their claims were time barred. Id. at 2271-72.
132. Id. at 2276-77.
133. Id. at 2277 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), in
which the Court held that states could bar in-person solicitation by attorneys because of
the strong likelihood of undue influence or overreaching). The Zauderer Court noted
that "printed advertisement is a means of conveying information about legal services
that is more conducive to reflection and the exercise of choice on the part of the con-
sumer than is personal solicitation by an attorney." Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2277.
134. Id. at 2278-79.
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crafted to serve the State's purposes. . . . Indeed, in In re
R.M.J. we went so far as to state that "the States may not
place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially
misleading information . . . if the information also may be
presented in a way that is not deceptive." 455 U.S. at 203. The
State's argument, then, must be that this dictum is incor-
rect-that there are some circumstances in which a prophylac-
tic rule is the least restrictive possible means of achieving a
substantial governmental interest. . . . We need not, however,
address the theoretical question whether a prophylactic rule is
ever permissible in this area, for we do not believe that the
State has presented a convincing case for its argument that the
rule before us is necessary to the achievement of a substantial
governmental interest."3 5
The State offered a different justification for its second type
of regulation-the prohibition of illustrations. The Court sum-
marized the State's argument as follows:
[A]buses associated with the visual content of advertising are
particularly difficult to police, because the advertiser is skilled
in subtle uses of illustrations to play on the emotions of his
audience and convey false impressions. Because illustrations
may produce their effects by operating on a subconscious level,
the State argues, it will be difficult for the State to point to any
particular illustration and prove that it is misleading or manip-
ulative. Thus, once again, the State's argument is that its pur-
poses can only be served through a prophylactic rule.18 6
The Court, dismissing this argument, noted that the State
had offered no evidence to back up its contentions. Therefore,
accepting such an argument would allow the State to regulate
advertising on the bare allegation that that regulation is neces-
sary to prevent deception." 7
Finally, regarding the third issue, contingent fees, the Court
did agree, consistent with dicta in Bates and R.M.J., that the
state could require disclaimers as to certain kinds of language to
ensure that the public is not deceived.' 38 The attorney's adver-
135. Id. at 2278. The Court added that "if the State's concern is with abuse of pro-
cess, it can best achieve its aim by enforcing sanctions against vexatious litigation." Id.
at 2279 n.12.
136. Id. at 2280-81.
137. 105 S. Ct. at 2281. The court included language that might ease the way for
television advertising.
138. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 201.
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tisement had stated that if a lawsuit failed, no legal fees were
owed. 39 The State had required adding a disclaimer that noted
that the client would still bear the cost of filing fees and other
legal expenses. The Court agreed that such regulation did not
violate the first amendment. "
V. EXTENDING THE RULE: GUIDELINES TO ADVERTISING
Most states continue to maintain rules of professional con-
duct that are inconsistent with the highest Court's commercial
speech decisions. 14 It is therefore difficult for the attorney who
is considering advertising to draw guidance from the contradic-
tory welter of state attorney advertising cases. The United
States Supreme Court rulings may be synthesized, however, and
logically applied to almost any kind of advertising. Part A of this
section will attempt to reformulate the Court's Central Hudson
rule, 1 42 and Part B will apply the Court's reasoning to some of
the choices faced by the advertising lawyer.
A. Central Hudson Enhanced
Throughout its commercial speech decisions the Supreme
Court has consistently encouraged regulation that would provide
the public with more information, not less.
[We] view as dubious any justification that is based on the
benefits of public ignorance .... Although, of course, the bar
retains the power to correct omissions that have the effect of
presenting an inaccurate picture, the preferred remedy is more
disclosure, rather than less. If the naivete of the public will
cause advertising by attorneys to be misleading, then it is thebar's role to assure that the populace is sufficiently informed asto enable it to place advertising in its proper perspective.1 43
Justice Blackmun noted in Bates that the Court did not intend
to "foreclose the possibility that some limited supplementation,
by way of warning or disclaimer or the like, might be required of
even an advertisement of the kind ruled upon today so as to
139. 105 S. Ct. at 2272.
140. Id. at 2283.
141. L. ANDREWS, supra note 96, at 62. In Washington State, the new RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT [hereinafter cited as Washington RPC] were adopted effective Sep-
tember 1, 1985, and will be referred to herein where appropriate.
142. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
143. Bates, 433 U.S. at 375.
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assure that the consumer is not misled.'144
The R.M.J. Court expressed this idea in stronger terms:
Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the
States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types
of potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of
practice, if the information also may be presented in a way
that is not deceptive. Thus, the Court in Bates suggested that
the remedy in the first instance is not necessarily a prohibition
but preferably a requirement of disclaimers or explanation.1 5
Therefore, the formula as set out in Central Hudson and
R.M.J. can be rephrased as follows:
Commercial speech may be regulated if (1) it is false, mis-
leading, deceptive, or concerns an unlawful activity; or (2) the
government has a substantial interest to be protected; and
144. Id. at 384.
145. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. See also Linmark Assoc. Inc. v. Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85 (1977) (ordinance banning "for sale" signs on residence lawns to help prevent
"panic selling" by white residents challenged on first amendment grounds). The Court in
Linmark stated:
The constitutional defect in this ordinance, however, is far more basic.
The Township Council here, like the Virginia Assembly in Virginia Bd. of
Pharmacy, acted to prevent its residents from obtaining certain information.
That information, which pertains to sales activity in Willingboro, is of vital
interest to Willingboro residents, since it may bear on one of the most impor-
tant decisions they have a right to make: where to live and raise their families.
The Council has sought to restrict the free flow of these data because it fears
that otherwise homeowners will make decisions inimical to what the Council
views as the homeowners' self-interest and the corporate interest of the town-
ship: they will choose to leave town . .. . Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy denies
government such sweeping powers. As we said there in rejecting Virginia's
claim that the only way it could enable its citizens to find their self-interest
was to deny them information that is neither false nor misleading:
"There is . . . an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not
in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if
only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that
end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close
them. . . .But the choice among these alternative approaches is not
ours to make or the Virginia General Assembly's. It is precisely this
kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and
the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First
Amendment makes for us. 425 U.S. at 770.
Or as Mr. Justice Brandeis put it: "If there be time to expose through discus-
sion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education,
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emer-
gency can justify repression." Whitney v. California, 174 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)
(concurring opinion).
431 U.S. at 96-97.
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(a) the questioned regulation directly advances that
asserted government interest; and
(b) the questioned regulation is not so broadly
applicable that it excludes non-deceptive information
along with deceptive information. s4 6
This formulation suggests that prophylactic regulation generally
is not acceptable and that the only acceptable regulation is that
which requires inclusion of any explanation or disclaimer neces-
sary to render the advertisement nondeceptive. The Court has
not in any decision stated directly that commercial speech regu-
lation is limited to requiring explanations or disclaimers rather
than permitting blanket prohibitions, 47 but the Court clearly
has favored such regulation because it eliminates deception by
increasing the flow of information. 1 8 This preference for infor-
mational flow must not be underemphasized in the context of
legal services, where the public admittedly lacks sophistication.
Thus, the R.M.J. Court suggested that the appropriate rem-
edy for a particularly tasteless and potentially misleading adver-
tisement-an advertisement announcing that an attorney was
admitted to practice before the Supreme Court-was not to bar
such a statement altogether, but to require that the attorney
add an explanation of the nature of admission to the Supreme
Court Bar."49
146. This formulation bears a certain resemblance to the classic "overbreadth doc-
trine," whereby a particular litigant may challenge a statute on first amendment grounds
by showing that it could unconstitutionally suppress speech, even if the statute was con-
stitutional as applied to the particular litigant. While the Court has agreed that "over-
breadth" analysis is not applicable in commercial speech cases, see, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 n.20 (1978), litigants have successfully challenged
regulations of speech by posing one particular advertisement that was not violative of
the state's interests but would be prevented by the regulation, see, e.g., Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The Court recognized
this resemblance, or quasi-overbreadth, in Secretary of State v. Munson, 104 S. Ct. 2839,
2852 n.13 (1984).
147. See, e.g., Justice White's discussion of whether a prophylactic rule would ever
be appropriate to prevent deception in commercial speech, in Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at
2278-79.
148. "[W]e hold that an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as dis-
closure requirements are reasonably related to the States' interest in preventing decep-
tion of consumers." Id. at 2282 (emphasis added).
149. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205-06. In Zauderer, the appellant attorney challeng-
ing Ohio's requirement of a disclaimer when advertising a contingent fee arrangement
pointed out that in many cases the Supreme Court had been reluctant to require a
speaker to speak, even if so doing would correct a previous falsehood:
We have, to be sure, held that in some instances, compulsion to speak may be
as violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions on speech. See, e.g.,
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The rationale of the Court in Central Hudson and Linmark
Associates v. Willingboro,'5 0 and the fundamental step in the
extension of the partial commercial speech protections to attor-
ney advertising in Bates, 51 demonstrate the Court's recognition
of a societal right to information-that is, a recognition of a
right to "individual self-realization." Attorney advertising and
the regulation of attorney advertising therefore should be
designed to further the flow of information about legal services.
It may fall to state regulatory bodies to take a hand in edu-
cating the public.152 Well-drafted and detailed regulation may
greatly help the advertising attorney.153 Regulation should, for
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Indeed, in West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Court went so far as to state that "involun-
tary affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent
grounds than silence ......
But the interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as those
discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette. Ohio has not attempted to "pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Id., at
642. The State has attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox in com-
mercial advertising, and its prescription has taken the form of a requirement
that appellant include in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial
information about the terms under which his services will be available. Because
the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified
principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides,
see Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc ...
appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular
factual information in his advertising is minimal.
Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2282.
150. See supra note 145.
151. See Justice Blackmun's extensive documentation of the general public's need
for information regarding available attorneys and legal services, in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 376 n.33 (1976). See also Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2282 ("the exten-
sion of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the
value to consumers of the information such speech provides. .. ").
152. "If the naivete of the public will cause advertising to be misleading, then it is
the bar's role to assure that the populace is sufficiently informed as to enable it to place
advertising in its proper perspective." Bates, 433 U.S. at 375.
153. The new WASHINGTON RULES, modeled after the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT (1983), are more succinct than detailed. Washington RPC 7.1 sets out the gen-
eral rule concerning false or misleading advertising:
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the
lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact
necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially
misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer
can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means
that violate the rules of professional conduct or other law; or
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instance, point out potential deceptiveness in the most com-
monly used advertising language. The brevity of the standard
advertisement creates a great potential for deception because of
the information that is not included. The greatest deception in
advertising lies in what is left unsaid, and what is left unsaid is
often far from obvious. 54 It is therefore not enough for court
rules to set out the general rule that advertising is permitted if
not false, misleading, deceptive, or regards illegal activity.
[Tihe Court's opinion does not "foreclose the possibility
that some limited supplementation, by way of warning or dis-
claimer or the like, might be required of even an advertisement
of the kind ruled upon today so as to assure that the consumer
is not misled." . . . I view this as at least some recognition of
the potential for deception inherent in fixed-price advertising
of specific legal services. This recognition, though ambiguous in
light of other statements in the opinion, may be viewed as
encouragement to those who believe-as I do-that if we are to
have price advertisement of legal services, the public interest
will require the most particularized regulation.15
In short, attorneys, through advertising, may educate the public
as to the subtleties of the practice of law. The question remains
as to who will educate the attorneys as to the subtleties of
advertising?
B. Advertising Practices-Deceptive or Not?
1. Print Media
All of the attorney advertising cases considered thus far by
the Supreme Court have been print media cases. 5 The print
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyer's services, unless the
comparison can be factually substantiated.
Washington RPC 7.1 (1985).
154. As Justice Brennan noted in Zauderer, while the majority agreed that the
attorney's advertised contingent fee arrangement, "If there is no recovery, no legal fees
are owed by our clients," was misleading in that the advertisement should have
explained that legal costs are not legal fees and that legal costs would be owed regardless
of the outcome, the deceptiveness in the language was far from obvious: "Several other
states have approved the publication of [advertisements] . . . containing the identical
no-legal fees statement, without even a suggestion that the statement might be decep-
tive." 105 S. Ct. at 2291 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (empha-
sis in original).
155. Bates, 433 U.S. at 402 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
156. Bates, 433 U.S. at 385 (newspaper advertisement); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at
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media is therefore the safest area for attorney advertising. The
Supreme Court has never found anything in that medium itself
to be inherently misleading, going so far in Zauderer as to allow
illustrations 157 and the offer of specific legal advice. The Court
concluded further that the print medium could not reach the
level of overreaching or undue influence that would justify a pro-
phylactic law.
It is apparent that the concerns that moved the Court in
Ohralik are not present here. Although some sensitive souls
may have found appellant's advertisement in poor taste, it can
hardly be said to have invaded the privacy of those who read
it. More significantly, appellant's advertisement-and print
advertising generally-poses much less risk [than in-person
solicitation] of overreaching or undue influence. Print advertis-
ing may convey information and ideas more or less effectively,
but in most cases, it will lack the coercive force of the personal
presence of a trained advocate. In addition, a printed adver-
tisement, unlike a personal encounter initiated by an attorney,
is not likely to involve pressure on the potential client for an
immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation.
Thus, a printed advertisement is a means of conveying infor-
mation about legal services that is more conducive to reflection
and the exercise of choice on the part of the consumer than is
personal solicitation by an attorney. Accordingly, the substan-
196-97 (newspaper, mail, and yellow pages); Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2271-72 (newspaper).
Washington RPC 7.2 states that subject to Washington RPC 7.1, a lawyer may advertise
through "public media, such as telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other
periodical,. . . or through written communication not involving solicitation as defined in
rule 7.3." The rule goes on to require that copies of such advertising be kept by the
lawyer for two years.
157. The Zauderer majority stated:
We are not persuaded that identifying deceptive or manipulative uses of visual
media in advertising is so intrinsically burdensome that the State is entitled to
forgo that task in favor of the more convenient but far more restrictive alterna-
tive of a blanket ban on the use of illustrations. The experience of the FTC is,
again, instructive. Although that agency has not found the elimination of
deceptive uses of visual media in advertising to be a simple task, neither has it
found the task an impossible one: in many instances, the agency has succeeded
in identifying and suppressing visually deceptive advertising. See, e.g., FTC v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965) [material deception to give false
impression of actual test to TV viewers by using mock test of shaving cream].
See generally E. KiNTER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 158-
173 (2d ed. 1978). Given the possibility of policing the use of illustrations in
advertisements on a case-by-case basis, the prophylactic approach taken by
Ohio cannot stand; hence, appellant may not be disciplined for his use of an
accurate and nondeceptive illustration.
Zauderer, 104 S. Ct. at 2281.
19861
324 University of Puget Sound Law Review
tial interests that justified the ban on in-person solicitation
upheld in Ohralik cannot justify the discipline imposed on
appellant for the content of his advertisement. 5
This is not to say, however, that any kind of printed adver-
tisement will not give rise to a disciplinary action. Probably the
greatest danger faced by the advertising lawyer is the inclusion
of terms in an advertisement that are clear and nondeceptive to
the lawyer but that may be misleading to the lay public. Thus,
the Court in Zauderer upheld Ohio's requirement of explanatory
language in an advertisement that mentioned contingent fee
arrangements. 159
An attorney must therefore draft an advertisement with
painstaking attention to how such language would be perceived
by a layman. An attorney, for example, might publish an adver-
tisement virtually identical to the advertisement at issue in
Bates.160 The Court in Bates did not say that this advertisement
was completely nondeceptive, merely that what potential decep-
tion existed did not justify Arizona's prophylactic regulation of
attorney advertising. But as Justice Powell noted in dissent:
In most situations it is impossible-both for the client and the
lawyer-to identify with reasonable accuracy in advance the
nature and scope of problems that may be encountered even
when handling a matter that at the outset seems routine.
Neither quantitative nor qualitative measurement of the ser-
vice actually needed is likely to be feasible in advance....
This definitional problem is well illustrated by appellant's
advertised willingness to obtain uncontested divorces for $195
each. A potential client can be grievously misled if he reads the
advertised service as embracing all of his possible needs. A host
of problems are implicated by divorce. They include alimony;
support and maintenance for children; child custody; visitation
rights; interests in life insurance, community property, tax
refunds and tax liabilities; and the disposition of other prop-
erty rights.'6 '
158. Id. at 2277.
159. "[W]e hold that an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as dis-
closure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing decep-
tion of consumers." Id. at 2282.
160. That advertisement listed "routine" legal services and the fees for such ser-
vices. One service offered was: "Divorce or legal separation-uncontested (both spouses
sign papers) $175.00 plus $20.00 court filing fee." Bates, 433 U.S. at 385.
161. Id. at 392-93 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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There can be little doubt that if Arizona had required a
simple disclaimer that many divorce actions would not appropri-
ately fall within the routine matter advertised, such a disclaimer
requirement would have been upheld by the Supreme Court.162
Another potential problem area lies in advertising the qual-
ity of legal services. Justice Blackmun in Bates suggested that"advertising claims as to the quality of services-a matter we do
not address today-are not susceptible of measurement or verifi-
cation; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to be mislead-
ing as to warrant restriction.' I
The American Bar Association (ABA), however, expressed
less caution regarding quality of services in its comment to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: "[Sitatements that a law-
yer's fees are reasonable, or that services will be rendered com-
petently or promptly, can be verified by reference to objective
standards independently established by the profession," but
statements comparing the quality of a lawyer's services to
another's services "can be misleading and require special cau-
tion."" 4 Another view was expressed by Justice Powell, dissent-
ing in Bates:
The advertising of specified services at a fixed price is not
the only infirmity of the advertisement at issue .... Appel-
lants also assert that these services are offered at "very reason-
able fees." That Court finds this to be an accurate statement
since the advertised fee fell at the lower end of the range of
customary charges. But the fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar services has never been considered the sole
determinant of the reasonableness of a fee.. . .This is because
reasonableness reflects both the quantity and quality of the
162. The Court in Zauderer held that a disclosure requirement need only be "rea-
sonably related" to the state's interest in preventing deceptive advertising. 105 S. Ct. at
2282. But see Zauderer 105 S. Ct. at 2288 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Jus-
tice Brennan suggested that Ohio's disclaimer requirement (upheld by the majority) may
have been so burdensome as to amount to a chilling of commercial speech and a violation
of the first amendment. The requirement demanded that the advertisement fully dis-
close the terms of the attorney's contingent fee arrangement. Justice Brennan also
pointed out that Zauderer's normal contingent fee contract was several pages long, and
such full disclosure "would be entirely out of proportion to the State's legitimate interest
in preventing potential deception." Id. However, this is the first time the Court has
noted a concern with the chilling of commercial speech and the Court at this point is
unlikely to frown upon reasonable disclaimer requirements.
163. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84.
164. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 7.1 (Proposed Final Draft
(1981)). (This comment was not included in the adopted ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.)
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service. A $195 fee may be reasonable for one divorce and
unreasonable for another; and a $195 fee may be reasonable
when charged by an experienced divorce lawyer and unreason-
able when charged by a recent law school graduate ...
Whether a fee is "very reasonable" is a matter of opinion, and
not a matter of verifiable fact as the Court suggests. One unfor-
tunate result of today's decision is that lawyers may feel free to
use a wide variety of adjectives-such as "fair," "moderate,"
"low-cost," or "lowest in town"-to describe the bargain they
offer to the public.16
This Article cannot resolve the problem presented by the
use of terms that may be objectively verifiable and yet in
another light inherently subjective. This is a decision that must
be considered carefully by the advertising attorney.'66
But what of advertising claims that can be objectively veri-
fied, such as an attorney's jury trial success rate or average per-
sonal injury recovery? These are considerations of extreme
importance to a layperson seeking an attorney, and therefore at
first glance worthy of protection under the public's right to a
free flow of information. However, even such naked facts can be
extremely misleading and are very likely to be challenged by a
state's disciplinary authority. An advertisement would survive
such a challenge only if it contained sufficient information to
make the statement non-deceptive. One possible approach
would be to advertise an attorney's sixty-five percent jury trial
success rate, but to add that many cases with less favorable evi-
dence never went to trial and, therefore, that such a success rate
was not indicative of the likelihood that a potential client's
claim would be successful.
Thus, while the medium of print advertising is not inher-
ently misleading, the unwary lawyer advertising in print may
nevertheless deceive or mislead the public. The concerns raised
above regarding the wording of a printed advertisement will
apply to other communications media as well. This Article will
examine only two other modes of advertising that present decep-
165. 433 U.S. at 394-95 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
166. According to WASHINGTON RPC 7.1(b) and (c), it is probably permissible to
advertise that one is "competent," but probably impermissible to suggest that one is a
"leading attorney in town." The distinction hinges on what exactly is an "unjustified
expectation." The advertising attorney would wisely avoid any language approaching"puffing". Another problem arises with the "unjustified expectations" that may stem
from statements that are factually substantiable. For example, a high success rate may
portray quality but in fact reflect only the attorney's choice of sure winners.
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tion problems unique to their nature: direct mailing and elec-
tronic advertising.
2. Direct Mail and Solicitation167
Direct mail advertising is perhaps of most interest to the
new attorney seeking to build a practice within a limited geo-
graphical area. A direct mailing is much less costly than televi-
sion advertising and is more likely than a newspaper advertise-
ment to receive close attention.168 The direct nature of the
contact, however, presents questions as to whether in some
instances a direct mailing amounts to an objectionable solicita-
tion of business.
While it has been said that "all advertising either implicitly
or explicitly involves solicitation,"'' 9 certain solicitation is
prohibitable. Because the Supreme Court has not attempted a
comprehensive definition of solicitation, to determine what is a
prohibitable solicitation one must look to the effect of that
solicitation.
(a) In-person solicitation
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,'170 the United States
Supreme Court affirmed disciplinary measures against an attor-
ney who had personally approached two accident victims-one
of whom was still in the hospital-and advised them to accept
his services. Such solicitation, the Court held, constituted over-
reaching, invaded the privacy of the accident victim, increased
the likelihood of a conflict of interest for the attorney, and, if
permitted, would be impossible to supervise.17 1 The Court in
R.M.J. cited Ohralik for the principle that the likelihood of
167. Washington RPC 7.3 defines solicitation:
[Clontact in person, by telephone, or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or
by other communication directed to a specific recipient but does not include
letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not
known to need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular
matter, but who are so situated that they might in general find such services
useful.
168. See generally Stoltenberg & Whitman, Direct Mail Advertising by Lawyers, 45
U. Prrrs. L. R~v. 381, 416-19 (1984).
169. Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 146, 412 N.E.2d 927, 931, 432
N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981).
170. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). This is the only case in the field of attorney advertising
where the Supreme Court upheld a blanket prohibition of a mode of advertising.
171. Id. at 461-62.
328 University of Puget Sound Law Review
unprofessional conduct was so great in in-person solicitation
that such solicitation could be forbidden altogether.172
(b) Third-party Solicitation
Certain dangers inherent in in-person solicitation also have
been identified in third-party solicitation-that is, soliciting a
third party to recommend an attorney to another. In Koffler v.
Joint Bar Ass'n, the New York Court of Appeals declared
unconstitutional the New York rule that prohibited direct mail-
ings to prospective clients. 173 Nevertheless, the court criticized
mailed solicitations by third persons: "For example, third person
mailings will, if their ends are to be achieved, almost always
involve in-person solicitation by the intermediary, and are,
therefore, much closer to speech of the type Ohralik has held
can be proscribed.' '7 4
The Koffler court also noted that a potential conflict of
interest is created when the third party solicitor may be a valua-
ble source of law business for the attorney.17 5 In fact, the conflict
of interest danger in such third party solicitation may be a
greater problem than the danger of overreaching and is probably
sufficient by itself to justify banning third party solicitation.
(c) General and Targeted Mailings
If anything can be concluded from the prior sections on
solicitation, it is that solicitation is most dangerous when used to
pressure someone to choose an attorney without allowing the
potential client the breathing space to consider and choose
wisely. A mailing to the residents of a particular city or neigh-
borhood is unlikely to create the same kind of pressure as in-
172. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202.
173. Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 151, 412 N.E.2d 927, 934, 432
N.Y.S.2d 872, 878-79 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981).
174. Id. at 144 n.2, 412 N.E.2d at 930 n.2, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 874 n.2 (attorney wrote to
real estate brokers, asking the brokers to refer clients to the attorney in connection with
the sale or purchase of real property) (citation omitted). Accord Greene v. Grievance
Committee 54 N.Y.2d 118, 126, 429 N.E.2d 390, 394, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883, 888 (1981).
175. Koffler, 51 N.Y.2d at 144-145, 412 N.E.2d at 930, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 874. Accord
Spencer v. Honorable Justices, 579 F. Supp. 880, 890 (E.D. Pa. 1981). In Greene v. Griev-
ance Committee, 54 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S. 883 (1981), the New York
Court of Appeals upheld a prohibition of third party solicitation largely because of the
danger that the attorney could become dependent on the real estate broker for client
referral.
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person solicitation, 176  even though the communication is
addressed to a particular individual.177 On the other hand, a let-
ter sent directly to an individual known to be in great need of
legal counsel, such as a badly injured and vulnerable potential
client, may constitute sufficient undue influence to equate it
with an Ohralik type in-person solicitation.1 71
In Spencer v. Honorable Justices, ' 7  the district judge held
the direct mail ban in Pennsylvania's Code of Professional
Responsibility unconstitutional. The suit was initiated by an
attorney who was a certified pilot and had a master's degree in
computer science. The plaintiff attorney wanted to use targeted
mailings to reach aircraft owners and pilots, and computer own-
ers and operators.'80 In invalidating the Pennsylvania rules, the
judge stated:
[T]o prohibit lawyers from selecting as the recipients of their
communications those who may be most in need of a lawyer's
services would totally ignore the reason commercial speech is
constitutionally protected-because it "serves to inform the
public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and
services and thus performs an indispensable role in the alloca-
tion of resources in a free enterprise system."18'
The Court of Appeals of New York in In re Von Wiegen' s'
took this reasoning one step further, holding that an attorney
176. Especially where an attorney stamps "This is an Advertisement" on the envel-
ope, as suggested by Justice Powell in R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206 n.20.
177. Many state regulations ban solicitation, defining it in terms of a direct commu-
nication to a particular individual, regardless of the means of communication involved.
See, e.g., the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983).
178. The concern in Ohralik was that in-person solicitation did not allow the client"an opportunity for comparison or reflection. The aim and effect of in-person solicitation
may be to provide a one-sided presentation and to encourage speedy and perhaps unin-
formed decision making." Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. A mailing directed to someone known
to be in grave need of advice, confused and frightened, may be said to deprive that
individual of a realistic opportunity for informed decisionmaking.
179. 579 F. Supp. 880 (1984).
180. It is not clear from Washington RPC 7.3 whether this Spencer type of targeted
mailing would be allowable. Washington RPC 7.3 prohibits solicitation, which includes
any communication directed to a specific recipient, but does not include letters
addressed generally to persons "not known to need legal services of the kind provided by
the lawyer ...." The Spencer type of targeted mailing is probably constitutionally
defensible (not deceptive or misleading), yet may not be considered to have been"addressed generally" to a person not known to need that kind of advice.
181. Spencer, 579 F. Supp. at 891 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
at 364).
182. 63 N.Y.2d 163, 170, 470 N.E.2d 838, 841, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40, 43 (1984).
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could not be prohibited from sending letters directly to the vic-
tims and families of those injured when the skywalk collapsed at
the Hyatt-Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1981.
That court found little chance of the overreaching or invasion of
privacy in solicitation by mail that had concerned the United
States Supreme Court in Ohralik. SS
Balanced against these "pro-informational" decisions
encouraging communications with the public is the concern of
the ABA that a "prospective client often feels overwhelmed by
the situation giving rise to the need for legal services and may
have an impaired capacity for reason, judgment and protective
self interest.' 4 The ABA Comment, noting the dangers of
undue influence, intimidation, and overreaching inherent in tar-
get mailings, also makes the obvious point that direct private
mail is difficult to police:
Advertising is out in public view, thus subject to scrutiny
by those who know the lawyer .... Direct, private communi-
cations from a lawyer to a prospective client are not subject to
such third person scrutiny and consequently are much more
likely to approach (and occasionally cross) the dividing line
between accurate representations and those that are false and
misleading.'85
The ABA Comment states that there are no effective mech-
anisms to regulate such communications, and that neither
stamping "advertising" on a letter nor requiring a filing with the
Bar would be sufficient. 186 The Comment agrees, however, that''general mailings not speaking to a specific matter do not pose
"1187the same danger of abuse as targeted mailings ....
There is some commonsense appeal to the views of the
Spencer and Von Wiegen courts. Indeed, it may be difficult to
imagine unduly influencing someone with a letter that has been
stamped "advertising" or a letter containing other warnings as
may be required by appropriate regulation.188 Nonetheless, an
183. Id.
184. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 7.3 comment (1983). See also L.
ANDREWS, supra note 96, at 71.
185. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 comment (1983).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Zauderer, in the section quoted at note 133,
casts some doubt about a printed advertisement reaching the level of coercion banned in
Ohralik. While the Court at that passage was not speaking directly to mailings, the infer-
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attorney would be wise to avoid a direct mailing if the attorney
has personal knowledge of an individual's particular need for
legal services or if the mailing contains language that might
unduly play upon the fears of a recipient." 9 It also would appear
prudent to stamp the outside of an envelope with notice of
advertisement contents to allay any fear that many recipients
might feel upon receiving a letter from an attorney. Such stamp-
ing also would avoid any appearance of interfering with a recipi-
ent who is already represented by counsel.
3. Electronic Media'9 0
The Supreme Court in Bates reserved judgment on televi-
sion and radio advertising: "the special problems of advertising
on the electronic broadcast media will warrant special considera-
tion." 9 ' At the date of this writing, the Court has not again
approached the question.
The debate on electronic media may be summed up as (1)
encouraging use of television as an incomparable tool for reach-
ing the segments of the population who most need to be edu-
cated about attorneys, and (2) damning television as an incom-
parable tool for manipulating huge numbers of people in
subliminal ways that are impossible to supervise.
The Iowa Supreme Court, for example, recently upheld a
regulation limiting electronic media advertisements to articula-
tion by a single nondramatic voice (not the voice of the lawyer),
with no other background sound. No visual display is allowed"except that allowed in print as articulated by the announcer,"
and the advertisement must be "dignified."' 92
The Iowa court pointed out the subliminal dangers of televi-
sion and radio advertising:
In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes acitizen who does not know some part of a leading cigarette jin-
gle by heart .... It is difficult to calculate the subliminal
impact of this pervasive propaganda, which may be heard even
ence may be drawn that the Court will not be likely to find such coercion where there is
no in-person contact.
189. So as to avoid Ohralik concerns; see supra note 159.
190. Washington RPC 7.2(a) specifically allows advertising by radio or television,
but prescribes no guidelines for such advertising.
191. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
192. Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565, 568-69 (Iowa
1984).
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if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought greater
than the impact of the written word."'3
The opposite side of the debate was articulated in a decision by
the Connecticut Supreme Court:
Some members of our society are functionally illiterate. Many
others, because of handicaps, financial circumstances, or per-
sonal preference, do not avail themselves of printed material.
Thus, television and radio are the informational media of
choice for many, and of necessity for others.1 9 4
The Connecticut court, unlike the Iowa court, was not
weighing a partial regulation of the broadcast media, but was
considering a total prohibition of such advertising. However, the
court did hold that the appellant's television advertisements 19 5
were not false, fraudulent, or misleading. 96
The ABA agreed with the Connecticut court's reasoning:
Television is now one of the most powerful media for get-
ting information to the public, particularly persons of low and
moderate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore,
would impede the flow of information about legal services to
many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may
be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can
accurately forecast the kind of information that the public
would regard as relevant.1 9 7
The Supreme Court in Zauderer did not approach the prob-
lem of electronic advertising. While discussing the deceptive
potential of illustrations, however, the Court praised the Federal
Trade Commission's ability to identify visually deceptive adver-
tising. The Court cited sources that describe the Federal Trade
Commission's efforts in regulating both illustration and televi-
sion. 98 Nothing in its analysis of the illustration's subliminal
193. Id. at 569 n.3. See also Comment, First Amendment Dialogue and Subliminal
Messages, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 331 (1982-83).
194. Grievance Committee v. Trantolo, 192 Conn. 15, 22, 470 A.2d 228, 234 (1984).
195. Those advertisements were complex productions that went well beyond the
Iowa guidelines and were actually rather humorous.
196. Grievance Committee v. Trantolo, 192 Conn. 15, 22, 470 A.2d 228, 234 (1984).
197. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 comment (1983).
198. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2281. It could be argued that the Court's attitude as
regards the success of the Federal Trade Commission implies that the Court sees no
inherent difficulty in supervising the electronic media. On the other hand, Justice
O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, specifically reserved judg-
ment on the manageability of electronic media supervision, in Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at
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potential implies that the Court would approach television
advertising in a more restrictive fasion.
The Supreme Court probably will not approve a complete
ban of television advertising, given its emphasis on a popular
right to a free flow of information, because television is arguably
the only realistic way of extending legal information to a signifi-
cant portion of the public. Even so, the deceptive potential of
television or radio advertising must not be underemphasized. An
attorney considering whether to use a snappy tune or attractive
announcer should be aware that commercial speech is protected
for the sake of its informational value and not its entertainment
value. A parallel may be drawn to the Court's analysis in Fried-
man v. Rogers,199 where the Court upheld a state ban on
tradename use by optometrists. The Court rested its decision
upon two major considerations: first, that the state had been
able to show that some in the profession had used tradenames
deceptively and, more importantly, that tradenames have little
informational value.200 The same may be said of an advertising
jingle or any other advertisement component that has high
deception potential and low informational value.
An attorney therefore would be less likely to run afoul of a
state disciplinary authority by keeping any television or radio
advertisement very simple, by paying close attention to maxi-
mizing information content, and by dispensing with frills that
may only distract from the informational content of the
advertisement.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rule applied by the Supreme Court in testing regulation
of attorney advertising may be stated simply: States may ban
speech that is false, misleading, or that concerns an illegal act.
The Supreme Court to date has not upheld a ban on prophylac-
tic regulation of printed or electronic advertising. But a state
may require that an advertisement include such language as is
2294 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
199. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
200. Washington RPC 7.5, contrary to MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 7.5, allows no use of trade names other than the words "legal clinic." In Friedman
v. Rogers, 440 U.S. at 15-16, the Court agreed that a prophylactic trade name measure
was not violative of the first amendment. Still, it is possible that a ban of law firm trade
names, absent a state history of abuse or deceptiveness, and without the facts of Fried-
man, might be unconstitutional.
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necessary to render a potentially deceptive message nondecep-
tive. Most states, if not all states, prohibit attorney advertising
that is deceptive or misleading, but much of the deceptive
potential of advertising is not readily apparent to the attorney.
The advertising attorney must therefore take extreme caution in
designing promotional information. While an advertisement may
be consistent with detailed advertising guidelines, it could easily
violate an overall prohibition of deceptive or misleading
advertising.
Television and radio advertisements have an extra dimen-
sion of uncertainty because of the imponderables of sound and
visual imagery. The United States Supreme Court has not yet
considered whether or not electronic media are inherently
deceptive; the Court could well limit the scope or complexity of
a television advertisement. 0 1 Lawyers wishing to advertise on
television thus should focus on informational content and not
visual or aural embellishments.
Those attorneys contemplating advertising should remem-
ber two things. First, the first amendment does not absolutely
protect commercial speech. The commercial speaker may be
heavily regulated and held accountable to a greater degree than
the non-commercial speaker. Second, commercial speech is pro-
tected only for its information value. An attorney designing an
advertisement should, for each facet of the advertisement,
examine that facet for its information content.2 02 If it does not
inform, the attorney would be safer to do without it.
Those charged with the responsibility of regulating the legal
profession would do well to discontinue total bans on specific
types of advertising or exclusive laundry lists of what the law-
yers may or may not advertise. Instead, the direction of appro-
priate regulation should be to require advertisers to provide
more information to reduce the probability of the public being
misled or deceived.
I would like to conclude this Article with a personal state-
ment. The analysis concerning my interpretation of the cases in
this area does not mean that I have pre-judged any disciplinary
201. Television advertising is not likely to be held completely prohibitable because
of its unparalleled ability to reach poor segments of the populace. One must keep in
mind, however, the potential for deceptiveness in the television format and the Iowa
court rules discussed supra at notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
202. That is, for each divisible segment of the advertisement, each phrase, illustra-
tion, jingle, and so forth.
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matter that may come before the Washington Supreme Court
for decision. To my knowledge, there are no pending cases
involving lawyer advertising. Also, this Article should in no way
be considered my endorsement of lawyer advertising. Even
though such advertising is constitutionally permissible to some
undetermined extent, its effect on the public's perception of the
profession has received too little attention. Lawyers' primary
function is to provide the public with access to justice, give
meaning to rule of law, and be the primary defenders of liberty.
Advertising may tend to direct public attention away from these
purposes of our profession and instead focus attention on issues
involving the marketplace and the pocketbook. To the extent
that advertising lawyers' services promotes public access to the
rule of law and to justice, its effects will be salutory. To the
extent that such advertising tends to place lawyers on a par with
commercial products or makes lawyers look like barkers at a car-
nival, it will demean our profession.
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